Friday, June 11, 2021

Repost of June 7

 

DOJ Up to its Old Tricks, Seeks Additional Agents and Prosecutors to Curb "Domestic Terrorism"

 

by Derek Gilna

 

            Biden's new-found appetite for criminal justice reform is being tested with a new federal Department of Justice (DOJ) initiative announced recently to fight "domestic terrorism," the newest DOJ crime "war." Criminal justice advocates like myself know that these wars end badly, with more federal employees justifying their existence and high pay by over-prosecuting or "manufacturing" crime.  (See the horrendous results of previous examples of federal prosecutorial overreach:  war on drugs; war on sex trafficking; Operation Playpen; Drug Stash Houses; not to mention prosecutions of "real estate fraud" and "medical provider fraud.") In all these instances, federal prosecutors used broadly-written federal statutes to magnify penalties for crimes that had previously been prosecuted on the state level.

            Fortunately, a promising coalition of US Supreme Court justices is telling prosecutors that they have had enough with federal prosecutors' expansive interpretations of statutes, in the case of United States v Van Buren,  19-783, January 3, 2021. The 6-3 vote crossed ideological lines. Justice Amy Coney Barrett, for the majority, wrote that the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act could not be interpreted in a broad way to support the conviction of a police officer who accepted money from an FBI informant to search through a license-plate database. The court’s three liberals sided with three of its conservatives. The other three conservatives dissented. 

            There are no new developments on any of the Biden legislative initiatives currently sitting in Congressional Committees, as the Democrats wrestle with challenges passing their infrastructure and voting rights agenda, putting more pressure on advocates of clemency reform, which has assumed new importance.           

            Various investigations, both internal and external, are quietly looking into the systemic failure of the federal prison medical system in dealing with the outbreak, management, and aftermath of COVID-19.   A March 2021 TRULINCS Survey by DOJ asked prisoners to rate that system. My guess is that upwards of 90% rated it "poor." Now what will DOJ (and Congress) do with that data? District court judges are now well aware of DOJ's medical system failures, and are still granting judicial relief, including the granting of 2241's, but only after your exhaust administrative remedies questioning institutional application of time-credits, and failures to offer timely medical care.             

             Another area of investigation should be the inability of DOJ prison officials to stem the unconscionable introduction of both real and synthetic stimulants into its women's facilities, which is a threat to the health of all medically-compromised individuals in those facilities.   Why are authorities, who are well-aware of the problem, not taking action? This should be cited in any internal or external filings for relief, especially if DOJ claims that its "Action Plans" have reduced health threats to prisoners from COVID.           

        Untreated post COVID complications have led to an epidemic of misery, with one Lompoc prisoner with high blood pressure, stage 2 kidney disease, and obesity complaining of nerve pain and tingling in both feet and both hands, now being designated for transfer rather than treatment. New CR petitions must emphasize the inability (and unwillingness) of DOJ to treat these lingering conditions. 

       There have been many favorable decisions in the circuits. In United States v. Abdulaziz, No. 19-2030 (1st Cir. June 2, 2021), the First Circuit vacated judgment imposing a five-year prison sentence upon Defendant for committing a federal firearms offense, holding that the district court erred in resolving what constitutes a "controlled substance" within the meaning of section 2K2.1(a)(2) of the United States Sentencing Guidelines," subsequent to sustaining at least two felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense." The First Circuit vacated the judgment below, holding that Defendant's Massachusetts conviction was not a conviction of a "controlled substance offense" within the meaning of that term as it was used in the version of section 2K2.1(a)(2) that was applicable at Defendant's sentencing.

            In United States v. Jarvis, 20-3912, (6th Cir. June 3, 2021), In 1994, Jarvis was convicted of four counts of armed bank robbery, conspiracy, and five counts of using a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. 2113, 371, 924(c). The court determined that his first 924(c) firearm conviction generated a statutory minimum sentence of five years and that his other four 924(c) convictions, repeat offenses, were each subject to a statutory minimum of 20 consecutive years and sentenced Jarvis to 85 years plus 11 years on his other convictions. In 2014, the Supreme Court clarified that for aiding-and-abetting liability under 924(c) a defendant must have “advance knowledge” that a firearm would be used. Jarvis successfully moved to have three 924(c) convictions vacated for insufficient evidence of advance knowledge. The district court resentenced Jarvis to five years for his first 924(c) conviction, 20 for his second, and 15 for his other convictions. The 2018 First Step Act amended 924(c), limiting the firearm convictions that count as repeat offenses.     

            Also decided in the 6th Circuit was the white-collar case of US v Hack, 19-6278, (6th Cir. June 3, 2021).  Hack pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit bank fraud, mortgage fraud, and wire fraud. The plea agreement contained an appeal waiver. In addition to terms of imprisonment and supervised release, the court ordered Hack to pay $803,420 in restitution to two mortgage companies, as required by the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA), 18 U.S.C. 3664(f)(1)(A). The court set a payment schedule during Hack’s imprisonment and stated: Upon commencement of the term of supervised release, the probation officer shall review your financial circumstances and recommend a payment schedule on any outstanding balance. During his period of supervised release, Hack moved to modify the restitution order, citing “a one-time opportunity” to obtain financing and proposing to pay the mortgage companies $100,000 and $28,000 in lump sums, attaching declarations from the companies stating that they preferred lump-sum payments over incremental payments. The district court denied the motion, concluding that it did “not have the authority under the MVRA to modify its final Restitution Order into two reduced lump-sum restitution payments.” The Sixth Circuit affirmed, concluding that Hack’s plea agreement barred the appeal.

 

           From Senator John Kennedy: "You can only be young once, but you can be immature forever." Be not afraid, and let not your heart be troubled.

 

        Federal Legal Center,    Derek A Gilna, JD, MARJ, Director,

113 Mc Henry Rd. #173, Buffalo Grove, Ill 60089 (and Indiana)

dgilna1948@yahoo.com (English newsletters and all inquiries, including Spanish),

federallc_esp@yahoo.com (Spanish newsletter only); Blog: "Derek Gilna's Criminal Justice Musings and Reflections"