Biden Feels the Heat: Reformers Demand Immediate Action; BOP redefines "Violence," to Reduce CARES releases.
by Derek Gilna
In a video
conference with Biden officials the past week, criminal justice advocates
expressed their dissatisfaction with the pace of reform, with at least one
calling it "unacceptable," since Democrats now control all levers of
Executive, Congressional, and bureaucratic power. All the sweeping legislative
initiatives, including the EQUAL Act, which would finally eliminate the cocaine
crack disparity, are currently still in committees, awaiting a signal from the
White House to bring them up for a vote.
Congress
may not wait much longer for that signal. Senators recently verbally roughed-up
the federal prison chief in an oversight hearing, and that pressure directly
led to the apparent loosening of restrictions on CARES releases. However, much
as it did on First Step reforms, DOJ immediately made internal changes to tighten
rather than loosen release criteria, only permitting the 25% threshold for
CARES release consideration to be offered to those 18 months from the door.
(This of course would not affect Compassionate Release Petitions, which permit
judicial action on prison releases based upon prisoner and family health
criteria, regardless of how much time you have served.)
There is
also a new bill that would repeal the Prison Litigation Reform Act. Repealing
the PLRA is part of Congresswoman Ayanna Pressley’s criminal justice agenda and
is contained in her People’s Justice Act. Access to courts is the key to
other rights; without access, incarcerated people have no ability to shine a
light on overcrowding, lack of medical care, rape, violence, or arbitrary
abuses of power by correctional officials. This bill has attracted many
co-sponsors, who know that it is a much-needed reform.
DOJ's broad
definition of what is a "violent" crime has also come under scrutiny.
A prime example of this is 924Ca or Hobbs Act conspiracy or
robbery cases, which have been deemed non-violent in most judicial circuits.
This is a prime candidate for judicial review, and given the current
composition of the Supreme Court, and it's stated hostility to administrative
agencies overstepping their bounds in issuing rules and regulations contrary to
legislative intent.
Those
individuals with immigration issues won a rare victory in the Supreme Court
this past week, in Niz-Chavez v. Garland, 19-863, which ruled that nonpermanent resident
aliens ordered removed from the U.S. may obtain discretionary relief if, among
other things, they can establish their continuous presence in the country for
at least 10 years, 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b)(1). The “stop-time rule” included in the
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA)
provides that the period of continuous presence “shall be deemed to end . . .
when the alien is served a notice to appear” in removal proceedings.
A notice
that omits any required information does not trigger the stop-time rule. Thus,
if the notice is defective, the 10 years, which could permit you to remain in
the country after release, could be
considered to still run, even if you are in prison.
COVID-19 containment
continues to vex prison officials, with former hotspots Rochester,
Carswell, St Dix, and Devans reporting new outbreaks (and some fatalities). Atwood Satellite Camp, in Lexington
, Kentucky, which also houses chronically
ill people, reports positive cases, aggravated by lack of CARES releases and
continued overcrowding.
Unfortunately,
conditions in the prisons are such that individuals who would not even consider
a flu shot on the outside have felt compelled to get a COVID shot, especially
since only 50% of the guards have gotten vaccinated, an unconscionable low
number. There has been some rare cases of side-effects to Moderna, including a
few cases of Bell's Palsy (face droop.)
In U.S. v. Hammond, 19-2357, (7th
Cir. 4-26-21), the court affirmed,
rejecting defendant's search suppression issues, but ruled that the district court erred in
instructing the jury regarding the felon-in-possession charge under the Supreme
Court’s “Rehaif” decision, and that Hobbs Act robbery is not a crime of
violence under 18 U.S.C. 924(c) or under the Sentencing Guidelines, so his
section 924(c) conviction must be overturned, and his sentence vacated
In US v
Green, 19-4703, (4th Cir. April 29, 2021) Green was sentenced as a career
offender under U.S.S.G. 4B1.1, after the district court found that Hobbs Act
robbery, 18 U.S.C. 1951, to which Green pled guilty, qualified as a crime of
violence under that provision. Five federal courts of appeals have concluded
that Hobbs Act robbery does not qualify as a crime of violence. The designation
increased his sentencing range from 77-96 months to 151-188 months’
imprisonment.
The Fourth Circuit vacated Green’s sentence
and remanded for resentencing. A robbery offense that, like Hobbs Act robbery,
may be committed through force or threats of force against property as well as
against persons is not a categorical match with any portion of the Guidelines
definition of “crime of violence” set out in section 4B1.2(a). Nor is Hobbs Act
robbery a categorical match for “extortion” as enumerated under section
4B1.2(a)(2).
In Us v Collington, 19-6721, (4th Cir.
April 26, 2021) In 2010,
defendant was sentenced to 30 years' imprisonment after pleading guilty to
various federal narcotics and firearm offenses. In 2019, defendant moved for a
reduced sentence under section 404(b) of the First Step Act, contending that
his sentence was ten years longer than the current statutory maximum. The
Fourth Circuit vacated the district court's denial of defendant's motion for a
reduced sentence under the Act, concluding that, in light of United States v.
Chambers, 956 F.3d 667 (4th Cir. 2020), the district court may only exercise
its discretion to reduce or not reduce any given sentence after faithfully
considering a number of resentencing factors.
One
criteria was the applicable statutory maximum sentence. The court explained
that, if sentenced today, defendant would be subject to the sentencing ranges
set forth in 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(C); that range sets a maximum mandatory term
of 20 years' imprisonment. The district court erred by not resentencing
defendant to, at most, 20 years' imprisonment and held that when a court
exercises discretion to reduce a sentence, the imposition of the reduced
sentence must be procedurally and substantively reasonable. Remanded, with
instructions.
Be not
afraid, and let not your heart be troubled.
Federal Legal
Center, Derek A. Gilna, Juris
Doctor, Master of Restorative Justice, Dir.
113 McHenry, #173, Buffalo Grove,
IL 60089
and also Indiana; dgilna1948@yahoo.com,
and blogging at "Derek Gilna's Criminal Justice Musings."